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Abstract 
 
Information technology is increasingly facilitating mechanisms by which information asymmetry 
between lenders and borrowers in the financial sector can be reduced in order to enhance 
financial access for human and economic development in developing countries. We examine 
conditional financial development from ICT-driven information sharing in 53 African countries 
for the period 2004-2011, using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions. ICT 
is measured with mobile phone penetration and internet penetration whereas information sharing 
offices are public credit registries and private credit bureaus. The following findings are 
established. First, there are positive effects with positive thresholds from ICT-driven information 
sharing on financial depth (money supply and liquid liabilities) and financial activity (at banking 
and financial system levels). Second, for financial intermediation efficiency, the positive effects 
from mobile-driven information sharing are apparent exclusively in certain levels of financial 
efficiency. Third, with regard to financial size, mobile-driven information sharing is positive 
with a negative threshold, whereas, internet-driven information sharing is positive exclusively 
among countries in the bottom half of financial size. Positive thresholds are defined as 
decreasing negative or increasing positive estimated effects from information sharing offices and 
vice-versa for negative thresholds. Policy implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
Information technology has been established to improve development in a multitude of 
ways, inter alia: living standards (Chavula, 2013); better life for all (Kivuneki et al., 2011; 
Ponelis & Holmner, 2013ab); welfare externalities (Carmody, 2013; Qureshi, 2013bc); economic 
growth (Qureshi, 2013a; Levendis & Lee, 2013); sustainable growth (Byrne, 2011) and financial 
access (Kamel, 2005) in developing countries. Furthermore, compared to the rest of the world, 
the potential for information and communication technology (ICT) in Africa is higher. 
Consistent with recent literature, whereas high-end countries in Asia, Europe and North America 
are currently experiencing saturation points in the growth of ICT (e.g. mobile phone and internet 
penetrations), there is great room for its penetration in Africa (see Penard et al., 2012; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016a). It implies that policy can harness such potential for penetration in order to 
tackle development issues, inter alia: limited financial access.   
According to IFAD (2011), less than 20 percent of households, on average, have access 
to financial services in Africa. Most of the population rely on financial services from the 
informal financial sector which is not incorporated into the conception and definition of the 
financial system. Limited communication infrastructure, poor transport facilities and low 
population densities contribute to the lack of formal financial services in extensive regions across 
the continent. In areas where such formal services are available, small and medium size 
businesses as well as low-income households have difficulties meeting lending eligibility 
requirements such as the ability to provide collateral and strict documentation. Even when such 
requirements are met, high minimum saving requirements and cost barriers (e.g. high transaction 
fees) can still substantially limit access to finance.  
 With the above background, access to finance in Africa has been substantially hampered 
by concerns of surplus liquidity (Saxegaard, 2006; Asongu, 2014a, p.70). Over the past decade 
and a half, the African financial intermediary landscape has witnessed the introduction of private 
credit bureaus and public credit registries as instruments of information sharing in order to 
mitigate information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers (Triki & Gajigo, 2014). 
Information asymmetry is concerned with the study of transactional decisions in which one party 
of the transaction is more informed than the other. Such imbalance or asymmetry of information 
creates disequilibrium of power in transactions such that one party can easily take advantage of 
the better information he/she possesses or charge a higher price for a particular transaction in 
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order to compensate for the lack of complete information about the transaction. In the former 
situation where one party has more or better information, the party is liable to moral hazard: 
which is the use of such information against the interest of the other party. Conversely in the 
latter situation where the other party lacks information, he/she is pushed to charge higher 
transaction costs because of adverse selection. In the case of a bank transaction, the lender is 
confronted with an issue of adverse selection before the lending transaction, while the borrower 
has an issue of moral hazard after the lending transaction. Information sharing offices are credit 
agencies that share information on borrowers’ default (i.e. negative information) and borrowers’ 
repayment (i.e. positive information) histories with lenders (or banks) in order to reduce adverse 
selection on the part of lenders. These information sharing offices also discipline borrowers in 
order to avoid moral hazard. Throughout the study, we use ‘information sharing’ to denote the 
activity of information sharing offices. 
The prime motivation for introducing these information sharing offices
1
 has been to 
mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection in bank lending. Accordingly, policies favouring 
underlying information sharing offices have built on substantially documented evidence that 
basic financial access is constrained by a series of factors that are endogenous to information 
asymmetry, notably: affordability, physical access and eligibility to bank lending (Batuo & 
Kupukile, 2010; Allen et al., 2011). In essence, information sharing offices play the role of 
brokers in financial intermediation. Hence, by sharing information, information sharing offices 
facilitate: increased credit and market competition, reduced credit constraints and efficient 
capital allocation (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002). Unfortunately, recent evidence suggests that, inter 
alia: (i) the concern about surplus liquidity is still very severe in African financial institutions 
(Fouda, 2009) and (ii) public credit registries and private credit bureaus are weighing negatively 
on financial intermediary development on the continent (Asongu et al., 2016). In essence, the 
relationship between the sharing of information and bank lending has been an open debate in 
empirical and theoretical literature (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002)
2
.   
                                                          
1
 We use ‘information sharing offices’ interchangeably with ‘private credit bureaus’ and public credit registries’ 
throughout the study.   
2
 “On the whole, all three models agree on the prediction that information sharing (in one form or another) reduces 
default rates, whereas the prediction concerning its eﬀect on lending is less clear-cut” (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002, p. 
2020).  
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In light of the above, one may reasonably infer that financial institutions on the continent 
have been taking advantage of information sharing offices to pursue a ‘quiet life’: using shared 
information from information sharing offices for higher profits margins instead of intermediation 
efficiency.  Financial intermediation efficiency within the context of mitigating surplus liquidity 
refers to the ability of banks to transform mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators. 
Quiet life is the short form of the Quiet Life Hypothesis. According to Coccorese and Pellecchia 
(2010), the Quiet Life Hypothesis is an assumption that financial establishments with relatively 
higher market power would invest little in pursuing financial intermediation efficiency. On the 
contrary, they would use their advantage to grant fewer loans at affordable prices to borrowers 
because they would rather prefer to exploit opportunities for higher profit margins or a ‘quiet 
life’ 
 To the best of our knowledge, the interesting body of literature (which we substantially 
engage in Section 2) on the role of information sharing offices in financial development has left 
room for improvement in at least four areas, notably, the need: to narrow inquiries to scopes with 
severe issues of financial access; for holistic financial development indicators; to leverage on the 
potential for ICT-driven information sharing for enhanced financial access and to account for 
initial conditions in financial development.  
 First, from the dimension of scope, despite the substantially documented issues of surplus 
liquidity in Africa, as far as we have reviewed, little scholarly focus has been devoted to the 
African continent which is experiencing severe issues of limited financial access. Moreover, 
studies on the continent have been limited in scope with a selected number of countries. To put 
this point in perspective, Galindo and Miller (2001) have involved no African country, Love and 
Mylenko (2003) have positioned their inquiry on four countries, Barth et al. (2009) have targeted 
nine countries and Triki and Gajigo (2014) have focused on 42 countries for the period 2006-
2009. This line of inquiry focuses on 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011. Therefore, 
positioning the inquiry on Africa is motivated by the scarce literature on the continent. This is in 
spite of policy concerns about whether financial institutions on the continent have been tailoring 
information from information sharing offices to enhancing allocation activity and efficiency 
(Triki & Gajigo, 2014) on the one hand and recommendations for more scholarly research on the 
subject (Singh et al., 2009, p. 13) on the other hand.  
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 Second, on the measurement of financial development, it is interesting to note that the 
broad and African-specific literature on information asymmetry (Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 
2010; Houston et al., 2010) and information sharing have specifically been oriented towards the 
measurement of constraints in access to finance. We steer clear of the mainstream literature by 
employing all financial dimensions documented by the Financial Development and Structure 
Database of the World Bank. These include financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and 
size. Financial depth represents money supply in the overall economy and liquidity liabilities (or 
financial system deposits) in the banking sector.  Financial system efficiency is the ability of 
financial institutions to transform mobilised deposits into credit for economic operators. 
Financial activity denotes the ability of financial institutions to grant credit to economic 
operators. Financial size represents Deposit bank assets as a proportion of Total assets (Central 
bank assets plus Deposit bank assets). We have already observed that the fundamental aim of 
information sharing offices is to boost financial intermediation efficiency. Increasing efficiency 
by reducing informational rents and boosting competition ultimately results in more financial 
activity or lending (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993, p. 2019). It should be noted that financial 
efficiency is generally the ratio of financial activity to financial depth (credit/deposit ratio). 
 Third, ICT can improve the role of information sharing offices in reducing information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. Ex-ante of borrowing, ICT can enable information 
sharing offices to provide banks with timely and more comprehensive information on borrowers’ 
credit histories. In the same vein, ex-post of borrowing, ICT can also enable information sharing 
offices to monitor and discipline the borrower. Hence, in the former and latter cases, ICT can 
enable information sharing offices reduce adverse selection and moral hazard respectively. This 
intuition is in accordance with Bergemanny et al. (2015) who have argued that information is 
crucial in understanding access to commodities.  To the best of our knowledge, there is currently 
no study on Africa on the role of ICT-driven information sharing in financial development.  
Fourth, on the need to account for initial levels of financial development, we argue that 
blanket policies of financial development from modelling exercises based on mean values of the 
dependent variable are unlikely to be effective unless they are contingent on initial levels of 
financial development and tailored differently across countries with high- medium- and low-
levels of financial development. The underpinning idea is that certain initial conditions of 
financial development may be required for the benefits of financial development from 
 7 
information sharing by information sharing offices. To the end, any resulting threshold effect (in 
terms of increasing or decreasing marginal returns from information sharing offices estimates) 
should validate the hypothesis of initial conditions and hence, avail more room for policy 
implications. The use of quantile regressions to account for initial conditions steers clear of two 
studies closest to the present line of inquiry, which have based their empirical strategies on mean 
values of financial development, notably: Triki and Gajigo (2014) and Asongu et al. (2016) have 
respectively adopted Probit models and Generalised Method of Moments.   
Four research gaps are apparent from the above narratives, notably: the little scholarly 
focus on financial access in Africa; failure to engage information sharing offices in the literature 
on linkages between information asymmetry and financial development; the essence of assessing 
how information sharing offices can leverage on ICT to enhance financial development and the 
need to account for initial levels of financial access in the problem statement. We attempt to 
address the research gaps by answering the following question: how do ICT-driven information 
sharing offices affect financial development when existing levels of financial development 
matter in Africa? Addressing the research question is important because it provides insights into 
how barriers to offering financial services can be lifted to enable small businesses and 
households maximise their earnings and savings for enhanced productivity, job-creation, 
contribution to higher income and ultimately, growth. Therefore the objective of this study is to 
investigate how information sharing offices use ICT to improve financial development.  
The positioning of this study contributes to the bulk of literature on the relevance of 
information technology for inclusive development, notably: socio-economic development in 
rural areas (Baro & Endouware, 2013); poverty concerns in urban areas (Omole, 2013) as well as 
community development issues in rural areas (Breytenbacha et al., 2013); education, social and 
human development  (Shraima & Khlaifb, 2010; Gudmundsdottir, 2010; Nkansah & Urwin, 
2010; Negash, 2010; Brunello, 2010; Krauss, 2013); social change and development outcomes 
(Brouwer & Brito,  2012; Mira & Dangersfield, 2012;  Islama & Meadeb, 2012); enhancement 
of  institutions (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a) and inclusive human development (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016b). Hence, this inquiry complements that growing body of literature on 
distributional externalities (Cozzens, 2011).  Whereas the underlying stream of literature has 
been engaged in both developed (Thakar, 2012) and developing (Sonne, 2012; Gupta & Jain, 
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2012) countries, we are more concerned with African countries because issues of financial 
access are more severe in the continent.  
By contributing to the macroeconomic literature on the use of information technology for 
non-exclusive outcomes, this inquiry deviates from mainstream microeconomic and corporate 
information technology literature on the management of technology for business avenues. Some 
recent streams of the highlighted literature have included: entrepreneurial opportunities for the 
ageing population (Kohlbacher et al., 2015); targeting of entrepreneurial innovators who are 
continuously innovating because of better skills and  financial resources (Best, 2015) and 
opportunity discovery and creation within the framework of disruptive innovation (Hang et al., 
2015; Wan et al., 2015).   
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 covers the theoretical and 
empirical literature. The data and methodology are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the 
results and discussions while Section 5 concludes with implications.  
  
2. Theoretical highlights and the empirical literature  
 Consistent with Claus and Grimes (2003), there are two main strands in the literature 
documenting the theoretical basis for an association between information sharing and existence 
of financial intermediaries. The first strand articulates the provision of liquidity by financial 
intermediaries whereas the second is concerned with the ability of financial intermediaries to 
transform the risk features of assets. Both strands build on the fundamental role of financial 
intermediation which is to increase allocation efficiency by mitigating the cost of channelling 
mobilised resources from borrowers to lenders. Corresponding theories on the role of financial 
intermediaries build on the literature of imperfect market information. In essence, financial 
intermediaries have the primary task of reducing information and transaction costs arising from 
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. Hence, the relevance of information 
sharing offices builds on the need for mechanisms by which the mitigation of information 
asymmetry can be enhanced in the financial sector.  It is logical to conceive that the role of 
information sharing offices is naturally facilitated by ICT. 
 The link between information sharing offices and financial development can be viewed 
from the perspectives of moral hazard on the part of borrowers and adverse selection on the part 
of lenders. Information sharing offices provide banks or lenders with credit histories and 
 9 
information about borrowers which help in reducing high interest rates due to adverse selection 
from banks. Once borrowers have had access to finance, they may be liable to moral hazard 
because they can conceal real economic activities upon which the credit is based in order to limit 
the payment of their financial obligations towards the lender or bank. It is the responsibility of 
information sharing offices to discipline borrowers on the unhealthy consequences of non-
compliance with their financial obligations. Often times, information sharing offices have to 
educate borrowers on the perils of defaulting on their debts and seeking refuge in the informal 
financial sector as a viable alternative to the formal financial sector.  
Consistent with Asongu et al. (2016), a substantial bulk of empirical studies on 
information asymmetry has focused on: the role of information sharing among creditors and the 
impacts of creditors’ rights to more information. The latter has principally been concerned with 
the influence of stronger creditors’ rights in, inter alia: (i) bank risk-taking by Houston et al. 
(2010) and Acharya et al. (2011); (ii) bankruptcy with notable works from Claessens and 
Klapper (2005), Djankov et al. (2007) and Brockman and Unlu (2009) and (iii) capital structure 
by El Ghoul et al. (2012). The former strand has been concerned with assessing how reducing 
information asymmetry: enhances the availability of credit (Djankov et al., 2007; Brown et al., 
2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014); reduces defaulting rates (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002); decreases the 
cost of credit (Brown et al., 2009); affects antitrust intervention (Coccorese, 2012); influences 
corrupt lending (Barth et al., 2009) and affects bank loans that are syndicated (Ivashina, 2009; 
Tanjung et al., 2010).  
 Noticeably, the engaged literature is skewed towards developed and developing countries 
where issues of financial access are comparatively less severe. In other words, whereas a 
substantial body of literature has focused on the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development economies and the emerging countries of Latin America and Asia, not much is 
known about Africa, a continent that has been documented to host firms and citizens with 
comparatively lower levels of access to finance (Asongu et al., 2016). In what follows, we 
engage literature within the context of Africa for the most part.  
Galindo and Miller (2001) investigate macroeconomic evidence on the underlying issues 
to conclude that relatively advanced economies with credit registries enjoy less financial 
restrictions compared to less developed economies with credit bureaus. In particular, well- 
performing public credit registries contribute substantially to firms’ decreasing sensitivity to 
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investment decisions for ‘cash flows availability’: a typical financial constraint proxy. The 
authors also establish that there has been about a 50% performance reduction by credit registries, 
notably: on the sensitivity of investment decisions to internal funds.  
  Love and Mylenko (2000) have used a combination of credit registries (private and 
public) and  of firm-oriented data from the World Bank Business Environment Survey to assess 
two main concerns, notably, whether as a result of more financial sharing from banks and the 
perception of managers, credit registries are negatively related to constraints in the financing of 
credit. The results have shown that private credit bureaus are associated with lower financing 
constraints and a higher sharing of financing from banks, while public credit registries do not 
have any significant effect on reducing financing constraints.  
Barth et al. (2009) have examined the effect of: (i) information sharing and (ii) borrower 
and lender competition on ‘lending corruption’ via information sharing offices using the World 
Bank Business Environment Survey data from 56 countries covering 4000 firms and private 
credit in 129 countries. The authors show two main results. First, corruption in lending is 
mitigated by banking competition and information sharing plays a positive role in the mitigating 
effect. Second, the ownership structure of firms and banks, firm competition and the legal 
environment have substantial impacts on corrupt lending.  
Triki and Gajigo (2014) have assessed two main concerns: the effect of information 
sharing offices in firms’ access to finance and the impact of the design of public credit registries 
on the degree of financing constraint. Their results reveal that financial access is relatively higher 
in economies with private credit bureaus compared to those with public credit registries or no 
information sharing offices and substantial heterogeneity exists in access to finance and the 
design of information sharing offices with public credit registries, among countries.  
Asongu et al. (2016) have examined policy thresholds of information sharing in financial 
development and concluded as follows.  Private credit bureaus and public credit registries exert 
negative impacts on financial depth, with the relatively higher magnitude from the latter. Private 
credit bureaus have a negative effect on banking system efficiency while the impact of public 
credit registries is insignificant. Private credit bureaus and public credit registries both have 
negative effects on financial activity, with a higher magnitude from the former. Effects of 
information sharing offices are positive on financial size, with the impact from private credit 
bureaus lower in magnitude.  
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As discussed in the introduction, the present line of inquiry complements the engaged 
literature in three main dimensions, notably, in the need to narrow inquiries to scope with severe 
issues of financial access; for holistic financial development indicators; and to account for initial 
conditions in financial development. To these ends, the empirical evidence is based on 53 
African countries, using all dimensions identified by the financial development and structure 
database of the World Bank and Quantile Regressions to articulate existing levels of financial 
development in the investigated nexuses.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 Consistent with Asongu et al. (2016), we investigate a panel of 53 African countries with 
data for the period 2004-2011 from the Financial Development and Structure Database and 
African Development Indicators of the World Bank. The starting- and ending-years are 
constrained by data availability. In essence, data on information sharing offices (public credit 
registries and private credit bureaus) from the World Bank are only available from the year 2004. 
The most updated year in the Financial Development and Structure Database is 2011.  
In line with the motivation of the inquiry, financial indicators from the Financial 
Development and Structure Database are transformed to obtained variables of depth, efficiency, 
activity and size. The computation which is consistent with Asongu (2013) is also motivated by 
the need to avail room for more policy implications. The criteria for selecting the financial 
development indicators are motivated by the need to incorporate all the four dimensions 
identified by the Financial Development and Structure Database, namely: depth, efficiency, 
activity and size.    
 First, financial depth encompasses: (i) financial system deposits or liquid liabilities and 
(ii) monetary depth denoting the monetary base plus time, savings and demand deposits as 
percentage of GDP. It is important to distinguish these measures because a great chunk of the 
monetary base in African countries circulates outside the formal financial sector. Second, 
financial intermediation efficiency in the context of this study refers to the ability of financial 
institutions to fulfil their fundamental mission of converting mobilised resources into credit for 
economic operators. Two indicators are used, namely: (i) financial-system-efficiency (‘financial 
system credit on financial system deposits’) and (ii) banking-system-efficiency (with bank credit 
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on bank deposits). Third, financial intermediary activity represents the ability of banks to grant 
credit to economic operators. Two measurements are used to this end, namely: (i) financial 
system activity (with ‘private credit by domestic banks and other financial institutions’) and (ii) 
banking system activity (with ‘private domestic credit by deposit banks’). Fourth, financial size 
is measured as the ratio of ‘deposit bank assets’ to ‘total assets’ (‘deposit bank assets on central 
bank assets plus deposit bank assets’).  
 Whereas ICT is measured with mobile phone penetration and internet penetration (see 
Tchamyou, 2016), ICT-driven ‘information sharing offices’, which are the independent variables 
of interest  are derived by instrumenting information sharing offices with ICT proxies, namely: 
mobile phone penetration and internet penetration. The instrumentation procedure which is 
consistent with recent literature on globalisation-driven debts (Asongu et al., 2015) and 
globalisation-driven peace and stability (Amavilah et al., 2017), is discussed in Section 3.2.1 
 In accordance with Asongu et al. (2016), control variables include: foreign aid, trade, 
GDP growth, public investment and inflation. The covariates have also been amply documented 
in financial development studies (Huang, 2005; Osabuohein et al., 2013; Asongu, 2014b;  
Owosu & Odhiambo, 2014; Nyasha & Odhiambo, 2015a, 2015b; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017). 
First, like with remittances (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Efobi et al., 2014), development assistance 
that is utilised effectively in recipient countries and survives the capture of consultancy services 
in donor countries, has a high likelihood of improving financial development in the recipient 
countries.  
 Second, a substantial body of the literature has concluded on a positive growth-finance 
nexus (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 199; Saint-Paul, 1992; Levine, 1997; Jaffee & Levonian , 2001; 
Asongu, 2002, 2015). Third, a strand of the literature is supportive of the view that openness-
friendly policies (especially in trade) are likely to engender a positive outcome in financial 
development (Do & Levchenko, 2004; Huang & Temple, 2005). Fourth, the relationship 
between financial development and investment is expected to be positive (see Huang, 2011). 
Fifth, some principal domestic macroeconomic policies like the maintenance of higher 
investment and low/stable inflation are conducive for financial development (Huybens & Smith, 
1999; Boyd et al., 2001; Huang, 2011).  
 Note should be taken of the fact that, expected signs of discussed covariates cannot be 
established with certainty because the underpinning financial variables are conflicting by 
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definition and measurement. For instance, the second variable or financial intermediation 
efficiency is defined and appreciated as the ratio of the third (financial activity) and first 
(financial depth), notably, credit/deposit ratio.  
Sources and definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 1, the summary statistics in 
Appendix 2, whereas the correlation matrix is presented in Appendix 3. Two points are note 
worthy from the summary statistics: the means of variables are comparable and the substantial 
degree of variation is an indication that reasonable estimated linkages would emerge. The 
objective of the correlation matrix is to mitigate potential concerns of multicollinearity that could 
considerably bias estimated coefficients. We notice that the issues of high degree of substitution 
are apparent exclusively between financial development variables. Fortunately, the concern 
about multicollinearity is not of nature to bias estimated coefficients for two main reasons. On 
the one hand, the financial development variables are used exclusively as dependent variables. 
On the other hand, the financial variables are employed in distinct specifications.  
 In what follows, we assess how information sharing offices mitigate information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers in order to enhance financial development when 
existing levels of financial development matter in the assessment.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Derivation of ICT-driven ‘information sharing’ factor loadings.  
Consistent with recent literature (Asongu et al., 2015; Amavilah et al., 2017), factor 
loadings are derived in Eq. (1) by instrumentation information sharing offices with ICT.  
The instrumentation procedure is as follows in Eq. (1) below. 
  titijti MobilePCR ,,,     ,                                                                                              (1) 
where tiPCR , , denotes public credit registries (PCR) in  country i  
at  period t ,    is a constant, 
tiMobile , , represents  mobile phone penetration in country i  
at  period t , and ti ,  the error term.  
 The process of instrumentation in Eq. (1) entails regressing the public credit registries on 
mobile phone penetration and later saving the corresponding fitted values that are subsequently 
employed as the principal independent variables in the Quantile estimations. It is important to 
note that the instrumentation processes is Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent 
(HAC) in standard errors. The derived factor loading is named ‘mobile phone’-driven public 
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credit registries
3
. The instrumentation processes is replicated for the remaining three pairs of ICT 
and information sharing offices, such that we also have: ‘mobile phone’-driven private credit 
bureaus; internet-driven public credit registries and internet-driven private credit bureaus.  
 As shown in Table 1, in addition to deriving ICT-driven information sharing proxies in 
Panel A, we also test for the strength of the factor loadings in Panel B. With the exception of 
internet-driven private credit bureaus that are not significant, the other ICT-driven information 
sharing proxies are overwhelmingly significant. Fortunately, this does not pose a serious concern 
to the inquiry because not all the factor loadings are employed in the regressions of interest 
because of issues of perfect multicollineairity.  As apparent in Appendix 3, there is a perfect 
multicollinearity between ICT-driven public credit registries and ICT-driven private credit 
bureaus. Hence, in the empirical analysis, only the former are employed as the independent 
variable of interest.  
3.2.2 Empirical specification   
We have motivated this inquiry with the need to account for initial levels of financial 
development. For this purpose, we are consistent with conditional development literature (Billger 
& Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012) in examining the effect of information sharing offices 
on financial development throughout the distributions of financial development dynamics 
(Keonker & Hallock, 2001). Within this framework, conditional financial development means 
the effects of ICT-driven information sharing on financial development are conditioned on the 
level of financial development.   
Previous studies on information sharing have assessed the nexus between information 
sharing offices and financial development by reporting parameter estimates at the conditional 
mean of financial access indicators (Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2016). While mean 
effects are important, we extend the underlying stream of information sharing offices literature 
by employing a Quantile Regression technique which distinguishes initial levels of financial 
development. Moreover, whereas ‘Ordinary Least Squares’-related regressions are founded on 
the hypothesis that error terms and financial development variables are normally distributed, the 
Quantile Regression strategy is not based on such an assumption of normally distributed error 
terms.  
                                                          
3
 ‘Mobile phone’-driven and mobile-driven are used interchangeably throughout the study.  
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The Quantile Regression technique estimates parameters at mutliple points of the 
conditional distribution of financial development. Hence, the strategy aligns with our motivation 
to distingush countries of low- medium- and high-initial financial development using 
contemporary and non-contemporary Quantile Regressions. In essence, the policy relevance of 
the Quantile Regression approach builds on the motivation that blanket policies on the role of 
information sharing in financial development may not be effective unless they are contingent on 
initial levels of financial development and tailored differently across countries with low, 
intermediate and high levels of financial development. 
The  th quantile estimator of a financial development dynamic is obtained by solving for 
the optimization problem in Eq. (2), which is disclosed without subscripts for ease of 
presentation and simplicity.  
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where  1,0 . As opposed to Ordinary Least Squares which is fundamentally based on 
minimizing the sum of squared residuals, with Quantile Regression, the weighted sum of 
absolute deviations are minimised. For instance, the 25
th
 or 75
th
 quantiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75 
respectively) are assessed by approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quintile of 
financial development or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                           (3) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quintile. This formulation is 
analogous to ixxyE )/( in the Ordinary Least Squares slope where parameters are 
examined only at the mean of the conditional distribution of financial development. For the 
model in Eq. (3) the dependent variable iy  is a financial development indicator while ix  contains 
a constant term, ICT-driven information sharing, foreign aid, trade, GDP growth, public 
investment, and inflation. 
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4. Empirical Analysis  
Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 which are related to mobile-driven information sharing 
respectively present findings corresponding to financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity 
and size. While the left-hand-side of the tables corresponds to contemporary estimations, the 
right-hand-side entails non-contemporary regressions. The interest of lagging the independent 
variables in the right-hand-side by one year is to have some bite on endogeneity (see Mlachila et 
al., 2014, p. 21). Consistent differences in information sharing offices estimated coefficients 
between Ordinary Least Squares and quantiles (in terms of sign, significance and magnitude of 
significance) justify the relevance of adopted empirical strategy. The findings are discussed 
paying particular emphasis on the effects of independent variables of interest throughout the 
distributions of the dependent variables. ‘Throughout the distributions’ implies that consideration 
is given to countries with low, intermediate and high initial levels of financial development. 
Given that the effects of ICT-driven information sharing are examined throughout the 
conditional distributions of underlying financial development dynamics, corresponding 
tendencies may take several patterns, namely: U-shaped, inverted U-shaped, S-shaped and 
positive or negative threshold shapes. Thresholds within the context of this study are in 
accordance with Asongu (2014b). Positive thresholds are established when corresponding 
estimates from ICT-driven information sharing consistently display decreasing negative 
magnitudes and/or increasing positive magnitudes throughout the conditional distributions of a 
given financial development dynamic. Conversely, negative thresholds are denoted by consistent 
increasing negative or decreasing positive magnitudes from estimated ICT-driven information 
sharing coefficients. Hence, evidence of a threshold tendency confirms the intuition of modelling 
based on initial financial development conditions, with the view that financial development 
benefits from information sharing may consistently increase or decrease concurrently with 
increasing initial levels of financial development. 
From Table 2, the following findings can be established. First, mobile-driven information 
sharing has positive effects with positive thresholds in both Panel A on money supply and Panel 
B on liquid liabilities. The positive threshold effect is consistent across contemporary and non-
contemporary specifications. Second, the evidence of a positive threshold established in Table 2 
is also apparent in Table 4 on financial activity across panels (banking system activity and 
financial system activity) and specifications (contemporary and non-contemporary). Third, in 
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Table 3, positive effects from mobile-driven information sharing are apparent exclusively in the 
50
th
 and 75
th
 quintiles for banking system efficiency and top quintiles for financial system 
efficiency. Fourth, in Table 5, the mobile-driven information sharing is positive with a negative 
threshold (or decreasing positive magnitude) from the 25
th
 to the 75
th
 quintiles in contemporary 
regressions and from the 10
th
 to the 75
th
 quintiles in non-contemporary regressions. Most of the 
significant control variables have the expected signs.  
Table 6, Table 7, Table 8 and Table 9 which are related to internet-driven information 
sharing respectively present findings corresponding to financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, 
activity and size. While the left-hand-side of the tables corresponds to contemporary estimations, 
the right-hand-side entails non-contemporary regressions. 
In Table 6, it is apparent that internet-driven information sharing has positive effects with 
positive thresholds in both Panel A on money supply and Panel B on liquid liabilities. The 
positive threshold effect is consistent across contemporary and non-contemporary specifications. 
Second, the evidence of the positive threshold established in Table 6 is also apparent in Table 8 
on financial activity across panels (banking system activity and financial system activity) and 
specifications (contemporary and non-contemporary). Third, in Table 7 on financial efficiency, 
positive effects from internet-driven information sharing are apparent from the most part 
between the 25
th
 and 75
th
 quintiles. Fourth, in Table 9, internet-driven information sharing is 
positive exclusively in the bottom quintiles of financial size. Most of the significant control 
variables have the expected signs.  
 We now further discuss the findings in three main strands, namely discussion on: the 
Quiet Life Hypothesis; comparative assessment with existing literature; and relevance of 
findings in the post-2015 development agenda. 
 First, the established positive effects of ICT-driven information sharing on financial 
development (especially from dynamics of efficiency, activity and size) attest to a non-
acceptance of the Quiet Life Hypothesis. In our view, non-acceptance is preferable to rejection 
because, the cost and profit functions of financial institutions have to be assessed for a genuine 
assessment of the Quiet Life Hypothesis in the African banking industry. Hence, it is reasonable 
to infer that African financial institutions are taking advantage of ICT-driven information sharing 
offices to improve financial access across the continent. This inference does not negate the fact 
that underlying financial institutions are also using ICT-driven information sharing offices to 
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increase their profit margins. In essence, financial access and increasing profit margins move 
hand-in-glove. In line with the fundamental objectives of ICT-driven information sharing offices, 
we might be tempted to go a step further to inferring that ICT-driven information sharing offices 
are relevant in stimulating competition and mitigating the abuse of market power by big banks, 
notably through reducing informational rents, sharing information to stimulate competition and 
rendering credit markets contestable (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993, p. 2019). The overwhelming 
positive role of ICT-driven information sharing offices in financial access is also a response to an 
evolving stream of African business literature which is consistent on the position that lack of 
financial access is one of the most important challenges to doing business on the continent 
(Bartels et al., 2009; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Tuomi, 2011; Darley, 2012; Tchamyou & Asongu, 
2017).  It follows that encouraging information sharing offices in Africa would improve financial 
access. 
Second, it is important to discuss our findings in the light of the engaged literature: (1) 
They are consistent with Singh et al. (2009) who have concluded that countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa which promote information sharing by means of information sharing offices are very 
likely to experience higher levels of private domestic credit as a share of GDP (or financial 
activity). (2) Our results are also broadly consistent with Galindo and Miller (2001) in the 
perspective that economies with relatively improved credit registries enjoy less financial 
restrictions compared to their counterparts with less developed information sharing offices.  
 Third, consistent with the post-2015 development agenda, it would be interesting if 
policy could employ ICT-driven information sharing offices to mitigate information asymmetry 
not just for ‘financial access’ but also for ‘inclusive financial access’. This recommendation 
essentially builds on three counts: (i) finance is needed to boost growth (Asongu, 2015); (ii) 
inclusive finance is essential for quality of growth, which entails poverty and income-inequality 
reductions (Asongu & De Moor, 2015) and (iii) an April 2015 World Bank report has revealed 
that poverty has been decreasing in all continents of the world with the exception of Africa 
(World Bank, 2015), despite the continent having experienced two decades of growth resurgence 
(Fosu, 2015). Therefore while according to the World Bank, 45% of countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa are off-track from achieving the Millennium Development Goal of reducing extreme 
poverty, tailoring ICT-driven information sharing offices for ‘inclusive financial access’ would 
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go a long way to helping lagging countries catch-up during the post-2015 sustainable 
development agenda.  
 
5. Conclusion, policy implications, caveats and future research directions  
The objective of this study has been to investigate how information sharing offices use ICT to 
improve financial development. To achieve this, we have examined conditional financial 
development from ICT-driven information sharing in African countries using contemporary and 
non-contemporary quantile regressions. ICT is measured with mobile phone penetration and 
internet penetration whereas information sharing offices are public credit registries and private 
credit bureaus. In summary, the following findings have been established. First, there are 
positive effects with positive thresholds from ICT-driven information sharing on financial depth 
(money supply and liquid liabilities) and financial activity (at banking and financial system 
levels). Second, for financial intermediation efficiency, the positive effects from mobile-driven 
information sharing are apparent exclusively in certain levels of financial efficiency. Third, with 
regard to financial size, mobile-driven information sharing is positive with a negative threshold, 
whereas, internet-driven information sharing is positive exclusively among countries in the 
bottom half of financial size. Positive thresholds are defined as decreasing negative or increasing 
positive magnitudes from ICT-driven information sharing estimates and vice-versa for negative 
thresholds.  From a practical standpoint, the fact that some findings are contingent on specific 
financial development quintiles implies that the financial development benefits from the 
association between information sharing offices and ICT cannot be achieved until specific levels 
of financial development are reached.  
 Four main inferences are note worthy from the results. First, African financial institutions 
are taking advantage of ICT-driven information sharing to improve financial access across the 
continent. Second, initial conditions in financial development are essential to achieve 
incremental benefits from ICT-driven information sharing. Third, increasing ICT-driven 
information sharing across the continent could address one of the most important challenges to 
doing business in Africa: the lack of financial access. Fourth, sampled countries could tailor 
ICT-driven information sharing offices to mitigate information asymmetry not exclusively for 
‘financial access’ but also for ‘inclusive financial access’ in accordance with the challenges of 
the post-2015 African development agenda.  
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 The main policy implication from the study is that information sharing increases financial 
system depth (deposits), financial system activity (credit) as well as financial allocation 
efficiency or the ability of financial intermediaries to transform underlying mobilised deposits 
into credit for economic operators. Therefore, ICT-driven information sharing offices can be 
tailored towards reducing surplus liquidity issues on the continent by enhancing financial 
allocation efficiency with more proportionate action on countries with low initial levels of 
financial development. The applicability of this policy recommendation is distinct from the 
extant literature because the policy measure is not blanket/broad but depends on existing levels 
of financial development.  
Information sharing offices could benefit from increased synchronisation of information 
by means of updated information and communication technologies and ‘knowledge economy’-
driven human resources in order to tackle voluntary and involuntary holding of surplus liquidity 
by African financial institutions. First, as concerns voluntary holding of surplus liquidity, 
underlying ‘information and communication technologies’- and ‘knowledge economy’-
orientations would enhance the ability of information sharing offices to: (i) ease constraints of 
banks in updating their positions in central banks so that they are not required to keep reserves 
above statutory limits; (ii) overcome transportation issues that oblige bank branches in remote 
zones to hold excess reserves; and (iii) ease interbank lending, especially for purposes of 
contingency.   
Second, information sharing offices with the underlying instruments could also be 
tailored towards avoiding involuntary holding of excess liquidity by: (i) dwarfing the inability of 
financial institutions to lend in scenarios of regulated interest rates; (ii) facilitating investment of 
banks in bond markets; (iii) increasing lending competition between banks; and (iv) broadening 
investment opportunities for banks in regional stock markets. Underlying information and 
communication technologies and knowledge economy instruments include, inter alia, reliable 
high-speed internet access and state of the art information systems in banks and information 
sharing offices; regular training of information sharing offices’ staff; recruitment of more 
qualified personnel and capitalization on mobile banking for inclusive development benefits. 
 In order to enhance financial sector development and facilitate regional/continental 
catch-up that is essential for policy harmonization, in the implementation of above suggested 
policies, more priority should be given to countries with low initial levels of development. This 
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is essentially because we have established for the most part that beneficial effects from ICT-
driven information sharing offices increase more proportionately with higher levels of financial 
development.  
 As a research limitation, the investigated influence on financial development is not 
exhaustive because some information technology dimensions have not been considered. 
Accordingly, other information technology dimensions (e.g., in terms of infrastructure, strategy, 
policy, governance, and/or management, etc.) can respond to the growing usage of mobile phone 
and internet information sharing services in order to boost financial development. This caveat 
can be addressed by future research as more data on the underlying information technology 
dimensions become available. Other inquires devoted to improving extant literature in the light 
of the sustainable development agenda could focus, inter alia, on assessing mechanisms by 
which information sharing offices can promote ‘inclusive financial’ access and examining 
alternative information technology instruments with which the inclusive effects of information 
sharing offices can be consolidated.  
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Table 1: Derivation of factor loadings 
     
 Dependent Variables: Information Sharing Offices 
 Public Credit Registries Private Credit Bureaus 
   
 Panel  A: ICT-driven Information Sharing 
     
Constant  -0.240 0.538 −1.364 3.186* 
 (0.698) (0.355) (0.254) (0.074) 
Mobile Phones  0.065** --- 0.151** --- 
 (0.029)  (0.026)  
Internet  --- 0.237* --- 0.162 
  (0.088)  (0.106) 
     
Adjusted R² 0.119 0.132 0.116 0.008 
Fisher 52.076*** 57.730*** 50.480*** 4.171** 
Observations  377 374 376 373 
Countries  51 51 51 51 
     
     
 Panel B: Testing the Strength of ICT-driven Information Sharing Factor Loadings 
 Public Credit Registries (PCR) Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 
   
Constant  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
Mobile.PCR 1.000** --- --- --- 
 (0.029)    
Internet.PCR --- 1.000* --- --- 
  (0.088)   
Mobile.PCB --- --- 1.000** --- 
   (0.026)  
Internet.PCB --- --- --- 1.000 
    (0.106) 
     
Adjusted R² 0.119 0.132 0.116 0.008 
Fisher 52.076*** 57.730*** 50.480*** 4.171** 
Observations  377 374 376 373 
Countries  51 51 51 51 
     
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. PCR: Public Credit Registries.PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. Mobile.PCR: ‘Mobile 
phone’-driven Public Credit Registries. Internet.PCR: Internet-driven Public Credit Registries. Mobile.PCB: ‘Mobile phone’-driven Private 
Credit Bureaus. InternetPCB: Internet-driven Private Credit Bureaus.  Values in bold denote significant estimated coefficients and the Fisher 
statistics.  
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Table 2: ‘Mobile phones’-driven Information Sharing and Financial Depth 
             
 Financial Depth  
 Panel A: Overall Economic Depth (Money Supply) 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  24.361*** 15.698*** 15.682*** 14.023*** 19.277*** 4.250 25.001*** 14.689*** 15.933*** 17.620*** 20.346*** 10.194 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.753) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.630) 
Mobile.PCR 4.580*** 2.304*** 3.190*** 3.535*** 5.649*** 8.995*** 5.087*** 2.418*** 3.911*** 4.565*** 6.060*** 9.921*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
GDP growth  -0.149 -0.166 -0.327** -0.487*** 0.350* 2.292*** -0.083 -0.114 -0.229 -0.485** -0.192 1.836** 
 (0.548) (0.407) (0.038) (0.002) (0.096) (0.000) (0.762) (0.686) (0.170) (0.036) (0.369) (0.020) 
Inflation -0.022 0.024* 0.012 -0.002 0.010 0.024 -0.048 0.029 0.015 -0.014 -0.027 0.007 
 (0.207) (0.084) (0.333) (0.898) (0.672) (0.660) (0.157) (0.150) (0.313) (0.510) (0.197) (0.934) 
Public Invt.  0.036 -0.139 0.217 0.870*** 0.150 -0.268 -0.032 -0.043 0.260 0.262 0.401* 0.054 
 (0.895) (0.558) (0.185) (0.000) (0.471) (0.602) (0.912) (0.874) (0.135) (0.246) (0.059) (0.942) 
Foreign Aid  -0.183 0.116 0.148 -0.019 -0.104 -0.215 -0.186 0.128 0.102 0.056 -0.136 -0.196 
 (0.295) (0.343) (0.120) (0.851) (0.565) (0.730) (0.297) (0.391) (0.312) (0.712) (0.461) (0.841) 
Trade  0.020 -0.046** -0.027 0.040* 0.062** 0.387*** 0.027 -0.034 -0.028 0.041 0.076** 0.264* 
 (0.591) (0.048) (0.163) (0.075) (0.042) (0.000) (0.500) (0.224) (0.172) (0.209) (0.019) (0.079) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.215 0.113 0.127 0.161 0.178 0.235 0.229 0.110 0.133 0.163 0.192 0.239 
Fisher  11.57***      10.49***      
Observations  294 294 294 294 294 294 258 258 258 258 258 258 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Depth (Liquid Liabilities) 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  17.239*** 6.536 9.446*** 8.393*** 13.498*** 3.736 17.519*** 6.308 8.582*** 9.723*** 15.286*** 3.247 
 (0.001) (0.106) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.748) (0.001) (0.304) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.821) 
Mobile.PCR 4.773*** 2.416*** 2.824*** 4.006*** 7.271*** 8.014*** 5.366*** 2.698*** 3.605*** 4.718*** 7.349*** 8.684*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.004 -0.008 -0.185* -0.394** 0.439** 1.911*** 0.032 -0.028 -0.140 -0.432** 0.591*** 1.785*** 
 (0.984) (0.965) (0.080) (0.017) (0.029) (0.000) (0.902) (0.935) (0.488) (0.016) (0.004) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.002 0.043*** 0.028*** 0.009 0.031 0.024 -0.013 0.048** 0.031** 0.001 0.014 0.009 
 (0.866) (0.002) (0.002) (0.653) (0.161) (0.565) (0.554) (0.047) (0.027) (0.925) (0.485) (0.862) 
Public Invt.  0.084 -0.089 0.436*** 0.583*** 0.156 -0.308 0.057 0.072 0.463** 0.362** 0.252 -0.222 
 (0.734) (0.573) (0.000) (0.000) (0.395) (0.425) (0.833) (0.817) (0.011) (0.037) (0.197) (0.652) 
Foreign Aid  -0.196 0.074 0.163** 0.089 -0.100 -0.229 -0.190 0.120 0.146 0.114 -0.187 -0.188 
 (0.237) (0.554) (0.012) (0.398) (0.555) (0.678) (0.264) (0.536) (0.148) (0.330) (0.295) (0.767) 
Trade  0.016 -0.022 -0.040*** 0.034 0.029 0.333*** 0.022 -0.031 -0.034 0.046* 0.026 0.324*** 
 (0.639) (0.377) (0.005) (0.144) (0.334) (0.000) (0.584) (0.372) (0.111) (0.073) (0.412) (0.000) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.253 0.117 0.099 0.156 0.240 0.253 0.271 0.113 0.103 0.166 0.261 0.258 
Fisher  14.31***      13.87***      
Observations  294 294 294 294 294 294 258 258 258 258 258 258 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. 
Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial depth is least. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Public Invt: Public Investment. 
Mobile.PCR: ‘Mobile phone’-driven Public Credit Registries. Values in bold denote significant estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
Table 3: ‘Mobile phones’-driven Information Sharing and Financial Efficiency 
             
 Financial Efficiency 
 Panel A: Banking System Efficiency  
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  91.682*** 52.712*** 82.275*** 87.819*** 104.04*** 136.08*** 90.547*** 69.672*** 77.491*** 84.603*** 102.89*** 125.48*** 
 (0.000) (0.872) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile.PCR 1.548 0.171 0.527 2.475*** 2.901** 1.031 1.465 -1.825 0.187 2.182** 3.617** 2.712 
 (0.102) (0.872) (0.619) (0.007) (0.030) (0.598) (0.185) (0.158) (0.881) (0.042) (0.011) (0.235) 
GDP growth  0.328 0.985** 0.331 -0.403 -0.316 -0.231 0.349 0.871** 0.580 -0.177 -0.480 0.609 
 (0.377) (0.052) (0.446) (0.297) (0.592) (0.771) (0.323) (0.030) (0.155) (0.660) (0.421) (0.461) 
Inflation -
0.0008*** 
0.0007*** -0.0003 -
0.0005*** 
-0.001*** -0.002*** -0.036* -0.036*** -0.038** -0.014 -0.029*** -0.045*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.862) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.065) (0.001) (0.038) (0.133) (0.003) (0.003) 
Public Invt.  -0.902** -0.632* -0.792** -0.163 -0.494 -1.037* -0.815** -0.644 -0.415 -0.025 -0.445 -1.100** 
 (0.017) (0.095) (0.048) (0.624) (0.375) (0.050) (0.027) (0.177) (0.313) (0.937) (0.277) (0.039) 
Foreign Aid  -0.432* -0.111 -0.446* -0.208 -0.412 -1.059* -0.373* -0.590** -0.333 -0.201 -0.361 -0.740 
 (0.061) (0.685) (0.088) (0.377) (0.261) (0.085) (0.089) (0.032) (0.235) (0.415) (0.254) (0.185) 
Trade  -0.177*** -0.138** -0.255*** -0.241*** -0.201*** -0.160 -0.164*** -0.212*** -0.249*** -0.184*** -0.193*** -0.175 
 (0.001) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.151) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.134) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.095 0.083 0.077 0.060 0.056 0.107 0.093 0.115 0.074 0.049 0.070 0.128 
Fisher  11.47***      4.62***      
Observations  299 299 299 299 299 299 265 265 265 265 265 265 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Efficiency  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  106.90*** 69.703*** 84.788*** 99.192*** 113.19*** 178.69*** 104.62*** 70.552*** 79.708*** 93.993*** 112.28*** 150.47*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile.PCR 3.885** -1.433 -0.091 1.086 4.450*** 13.653*** 4.394** -2.164* -0.135 1.459 4.403*** 19.087*** 
 (0.018) (0.286) (0.936) (0.122) (0.000) (0.001) (0.023) (0.055) (0.892) (0.190) (0.002) (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.088 0.625 0.099 -0.826*** -0.784 0.503 0.340 1.398*** 0.542* -0.315 -0.562 0.655 
 (0.847) (0.310) (0.833) (0.005) (0.151) (0.747) (0.436) (0.002) (0.099) (0.448) (0.333) (0.659) 
Inflation -0.118** -0.209*** -0.039 -0.109*** -0.147 -0.122 -0.186* -0.629*** -0.234*** -0.234** -0.150*** -0.160 
 (0.032) (0.000) (0.365) (0.003) (0.117) (0.232) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.208) 
Public Invt.  -1.169** -0.638 -0.477 -0.083 -0.597 -2.419 -1.174** -0.549 -0.168 -0.043 -0.598 -0.902 
 (0.016) (0.310) (0.262) (0.737) (0.228) (0.191) (0.020) (0.140) (0.615) (0.909) (0.255) (0.169) 
Foreign Aid  -0.698** -0.629* -0.546** -0.455** -0.344 -1.328 -0.617** -0.673** -0.491** -0.418 -0.257 -0.974 
 (0.021) (0.091) (0.048) (0.011) (0.298) (0.246) (0.033) (0.014) (0.025) (0.106) (0.463) (0.396) 
Trade  -0.306*** -0.200** -0.278*** -0.277*** -0.308*** -0.703*** -0.293*** -0.219*** -0.239*** -0.228*** -0.296*** -0.611*** 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.151 0.069 0.081 0.072 0.052 0.140 0.150 0.109 0.081 0.062 0.060 0.175 
Fisher  5.47***      4.58***      
Observations  294 294 294 294 294 294 258 258 258 258 258 258 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. 
Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial efficiency is least. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Public Invt: Public Investment. 
Mobile.PCR: ‘Mobile phone’-driven Public Credit Registries. Values in bold denote significant estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 
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Table 4: ‘Mobile phones’-driven Information Sharing and Financial Activity 
             
 Financial Activity 
 Panel A: Banking System Activity 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  16.939*** 8.533*** 7.122*** 9.010*** 17.735*** 19.764** 16.653*** 8.986*** 7.119** 9.395*** 19.797*** 18.431*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Mobile.PCR 4.502*** 1.215*** 2.130*** 3.618*** 7.574*** 9.445*** 5.161*** 1.195*** 1.845*** 4.216*** 8.440*** 9.353*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.077 0.001 -0.031 -0.207 0.846*** 0.362 0.153 0.015 -0.046 -0.153 0.529** 0.981*** 
 (0.698) (0.992) (0.793) (0.213) (0.000) (0.253) (0.463) (0.897) (0.821) (0.157) (0.016) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.020 0.014* 0.006 -0.005 0.032 -0.018 -0.043 0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.033 
 (0.244) (0.097) (0.527) (0.793) (0.239) (0.494) (0.176) (0.827) (0.813) (0.694) (0.819) (0.140) 
Public Invt.  -0.426** 0.059 -0.140 0.099 -0.129 -0.199 -0.468** 0.045 -0.075 0.110 -0.026 -0.751*** 
 (0.025) (0.551) (0.189) (0.497) (0.592) (0.504) (0.023) (0.533) (0.628) (0.308) (0.903) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  -0.239* -0.028 0.105 0.097 -0.351 -0.335 -0.207 -0.061 0.043 0.103 -0.254 -0.278 
 (0.081) (0.695) (0.145) (0.332) (0.113) (0.415) (0.135) (0.375) (0.660) (0.157) (0.206) (0.331) 
Trade  -0.013 -0.065*** -0.023 -0.022 -0.068* 0.063 -0.008 -0.063*** -0.001 -0.024 -0.079** 0.127*** 
(0.656) (0.000) (0.118) (0.310) (0.076) (0.218) (0.798) (0.000) (0.930) (0.129) (0.024) (0.000) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.283 0.091 0.077 0.103 0.213 0.357 0.303 0.089 0.062 0.108 0.244 0.398 
Fisher  11.74***      10.75***      
Observations  294 294 294 294 294 294 258 258 258 258 258 258 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Activity  
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  22.567*** 8.512*** 7.214*** 8.539*** 17.642*** 32.995** 21.907*** 9.185*** 6.638*** 9.219*** 18.985*** 35.855** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.003) (0.033) 
Mobile.PCR 5.956*** 1.114*** 1.877*** 3.670*** 8.564*** 14.140*** 6.912*** 1.184*** 1.896*** 4.201*** 9.035*** 16.733*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.112 0.009 -0.045 -0.191 0.606** 0.202 0.187 0.023 -0.088 -0.152 0.507* -0.341 
 (0.656) (0.944) (0.764) (0.208) (0.031) (0.743) (0.472) (0.858) (0.604) (0.204) (0.083) (0.629) 
Inflation -0.013 0.017** 0.007 -0.002 0.030 -0.009 -0.036 0.006 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.053 
 (0.483) (0.027) (0.539) (0.879) (0.320) (0.866) (0.275) (0.583) (0.685) (0.860) (0.947) (0.418) 
Public Invt.  -0.479** 0.089 -0.052 0.087 -0.052 0.144 -0.538** 0.058 -0.063 0.127 -0.006 0.751 
 (0.044) (0.306) (0.719) (0.524) (0.846) (0.750) (0.045) (0.482) (0.638) (0.284) (0.982) (0.158) 
Foreign Aid  -0.385** -0.020 0.101 0.124 -0.296 -0.404 -0.338* -0.071 0.094 0.103 -0.197 -0.418 
 (0.026) (0.782) (0.261) (0.194) (0.238) (0.615) (0.050) (0.345) (0.263) (0.203) (0.459) (0.611) 
Trade  -0.081* -0.069*** -0.026 -0.020 -0.074 -0.165 -0.074 -0.067*** -0.001 -0.024 -0.079* -0.215 
 (0.055) (0.000) (0.165) (0.322) (0.104) (0.144) (0.101) (0.000) (0.930) (0.175) (0.093) (0.165) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.259 0.072 0.062 0.084 0.169 0.307 0.277 0.072 0.051 0.087 0.193 0.341 
Fisher  8.52***      8.09***      
Observations  296 296 296 296 296 296 260 260 260 260 260 260 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. 
Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial activity is least. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Public Invt: Public Investment. 
Mobile.PCR: ‘Mobile phone’-driven Public Credit Registries. Values in bold denote significant estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 
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Table 5: ‘Mobile phones’-driven Information Sharing and Financial Size 
             
 Financial Size 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  73.623*** 49.190*** 62.741*** 82.988*** 95.353*** 96.664*** 72.890*** 47.151*** 58.743*** 82/694*** 93.626*** 97.206*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile.PCR 2.638*** 0.084 3.349*** 1.973*** 0.660*** 0.224 2.830*** 5.029*** 4.112*** 2.181*** 1.002*** 0.236 
 (0.000) (0.911) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.277) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.229) 
GDP growth  -0.116 0.084 -0.528 -0.030 -0.228*** -0.028 0.060 0.145 -0.352 0.156 0.033 -0.011 
 (0.658) (0.911) (0.102) (0.907) (0.001) (0.683) (0.820) (0.771) (0.396) (0.358) (0.681) (0.830) 
Inflation -0.063** 0.022 -0.054** -0.097*** -0.068*** -0.073*** 0.0005*** 0.001*** 0.0008*** 0.0003*** -0.00001 -0.0003*** 
 (0.048) (0.638) (0.042) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.820) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  0.656*** 0.949 0.572*** 0.311 0.287*** 0.220*** 0.572*** 0.852*** 0.410* 0.232 0.216*** 0.062 
 (0.000) (0.127) (0.004) (0.178) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.096) (0.126) (0.008) (0.241) 
Foreign Aid  -0.583*** -0.533 -0.592*** -0.669*** -0.805*** -0.429*** -0.512*** -0.315 -0.400** -0.714*** -0.672*** -0.295*** 
 (0.000) (0.129) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.208) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade  0.031 -0.021 0.074** 0.033 0.014 0.019** 0.041 -0.008 0.122*** 0.036 0.006 0.014* 
 (0.301) (0.814) (0.049) (0.340) (0.141) (0.041) (0.174) (0.898) (0.009) (0.108) (0.628) (0.059) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.295 0.175 0.229 0.208 0.211 0.116 0.264 0.176 0.214 0.200 0.182 0.095 
Fisher  33.28***      29.98***      
Observations  295 295 295 295 295 295 263 263 263 263 263 263 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. 
Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial size is least. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Public Invt: Public Investment. 
Mobile.PCR: ‘Mobile phone’-driven Public Credit Registries. Values in bold denote significant estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 
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Table 6: Internet-driven Information Sharing and Financial Depth 
             
 Financial Depth  
 Panel A: Overall Economic Depth (Money Supply) 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  14.030*** 8.899** 10.330*** 13.784*** 15.297*** 1.748 14.404*** 10.265** 10.505*** 16.377*** 15.257*** 16.061* 
 (0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.845) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.063) 
Internet.PCR 8.545*** 6.009*** 6.533*** 7.960*** 10.300*** 14.078*** 9.567*** 6.331*** 7.465*** 9.033*** 13.181*** 15.173*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.352* -0.258 -0.365*** -0.620*** -0.329** 0.241 -0.289 -0.160 -0.290* -0.567** -0.105 -0.497 
 (0.062) (0.370) (0.005) (0.003) (0.045) (0.610) (0.139) (0.649) (0.077) (0.010) (0.560) (0.220) 
Inflation -0.058*** -0.011 -0.024** -0.061** -0.067*** -0.076* -0.078*** -0.007 -0.026** -0.072*** -0.088*** -0.133*** 
 (0.000) (0.582) (0.022) (0.015) (0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.773) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  0.366 0.064 0.324** 0.680*** 0.774*** 1.387*** 0.137 -0.039 0.214 0.257 0.339** 1.166*** 
 (0.143) (0.836) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.566) (0.896) (0.219) (0.229) (0.031) (0.002) 
Foreign Aid  0.014 0.184 0.164** -0.040 -0.115 -0.007 0.023 0.100 0.100 0.028 -0.053 -0.209 
 (0.888) (0.336) (0.024) (0.729) (0.310) (0.983) (0.833) (0.565) (0.247) (0.837) (0.643) (0.404) 
Trade  0.025 -0.024 -0.023 0.021 0.022 0.131* 0.038 -0.018 -0.800 0.018 0.013 0.035 
 (0.408) (0.541) (0.157) (0.419) (0.306) (0.070) (0.223) (0.540) (0.691) (0.577) (0.587) (0.612) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.571 0.206 0.238 0.316 0.432 0.516 0.581 0.204 0.239 0.322 0.439 0.522 
Fisher  47.59***      32.58***      
Observations  290 290 290 290 290 290 256 256 256 256 256 256 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Depth (Liquid Liabilities) 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  9.466*** 0.716 7.004*** 6.144*** 6.091* 5.685 9.777*** 1.063 8.120*** 6.672*** 7.133** 4.718 
 (0.004) (0.815) (0.006) (0.005) (0.064) (0.417) (0.007) (0.725) (0.003) (0.001) (0.011) (0.446) 
Internet.PCR 7.989*** 5.655*** 6.226*** 7.347*** 11.341*** 15.832*** 8.814*** 6.753*** 6.630*** 9.017*** 13.016*** 17.188*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.239 -0.220 -0.501*** -0.455*** 0.081 0.322 -0.207 -0.091 -0.294* -0.418*** -0.004 0.261 
 (0.194) (0.228) (0.001) (0.000) (0.666) (0.345) (0.278) (0.645) (0.073) (0.001) (0.976) (0.369) 
Inflation -0.037*** 0.003 -0.022 -0.030 -0.042** -0.070*** -0.051*** 0.008 -0.019 -0.048*** -0.071*** -0.097*** 
 (0.001) (0.775) (0.101) (0.176) (0.027) (0.003) (0.000) (0.595) (0.149) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  0.421* 0.102 0.408** 0.696*** 0.643*** 1.091*** 0.250 0.063 0.053 0.398*** 0.529*** 0.904*** 
 (0.073) (0.605) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.282) (0.746) (0.767) (0.000) (0.0000) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  -0.078 0.092 0.161* 0.057 -0.083 -0.197 -0.072 0.057 0.116 0.074 -0.084 -0.182 
 (0.457) (0.435) (0.076) (0.453) (0.551) (0.528) (0.511) (0.618) (0.186) (0.300) (0.433) (0.428) 
Trade  0.021 0.009 -0.024 0.017 0.026 0.003 0.033 -0.004 -0.008 0.024 0.023 0.036 
 (0.440) (0.741) (0.259) (0.336) (0.317) (0.942) (0.262) (0.860) (0.722) (0.157) (0.276) (0.471) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.567 0.235 0.235 0.335 0.443 0.501 0.567 0.226 0.232 0.340 0.456 0.499 
Fisher  37.09***      27.52***      
Observations  290 290 290 290 290 290 256 256 256 256 256 256 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. 
Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial depth is least. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Public Invt: Public Investment. 
Internet.PCR: Internet-driven Public Credit Registries. Values in bold denote significant estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 
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Table 7: Internet-driven Information Sharing and Financial Efficiency 
             
 Financial Efficiency 
 Panel A: Banking System Efficiency  
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  92.603*** 44.075*** 77.175*** 92.241*** 110.54*** 134.78*** 90.295*** 46.825*** 71.759*** 83.519*** 107.14*** 140.19*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet.PCR 1.351* 2.074* 1.781** 2.502*** 2.383* -0.519 1.654* 2.003 2.082** 3.436*** 2.802** 0.269 
 (0.089) (0.065) (0.018) (0.006) (0.052) (0.743) (0.071) (0.183) (0.037) (0.000) (0.026) (0.919) 
GDP growth  0.255 1.111** 0.434 -0.507 -0.489 1.024* 0.295 1.268*** 0.578 -0.075 -0.391 -0.139 
 (0.485) (0.011) (0.220) (0.191) (0.382) (0.094) (0.403) (0.001) (0.133) (0/834) (0.477) (0.864) 
Inflation -
0.0009*** 
0.0007*** -0.00009 -
0.0008*** 
-0.001*** -0.002*** -0.042** 0.009 -0.042** -0.019** -0.038*** -0.059*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.569) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) (0.446) (0.023) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  -0.834** -0.555 -0.725** 0.029 -0.849 -1.218*** -0.713** -0.701 -0.442 0.072 -0.450 -1.267** 
 (0.024) (0.184) (0.047) (0.931) (0.103) (0.007) (0.038) (0.151) (0.303) (0.808) (0.225) (0.018) 
Foreign Aid  -0.467** 0.094 -0.354 -0.314 -0.491 -1.267*** -0.390** 0.054 -0.193 -0.239 -0.555* -0.0125 
 (0.026) (0.740) (0.100) (0.181) (0.107) (0.007) (0.049) (0.880) (0.460) (0.268) (0.059) (0.105) 
Trade  -0.179*** -0.123* -0.249*** -0.292*** -0.217*** -0.117 -0.166*** -0.131 -0.236*** -0.211*** -0.202*** -0.173 
 (0.001) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.194) (0.003) (0.123) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.14) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.092 0.092 0.083 0.063 0.050 0.106 0.095 0.098 0.079 0.052 0.064 0.117 
Fisher  10.17***      4.54***      
Observations  295 295 295 295 295 295 263 263 263 263 263 263 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Efficiency  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  114.56*** 36.701*** 78.495*** 97.682*** 114.91*** 178.08*** 112.29*** 59.472*** 76.040*** 92.695*** 114.97*** 166.09*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet.PCR 1.819* 3.428*** 2.389*** 1.835*** 2.106* -0.470 2.052* 0.817 1.664** 2.543*** 2.772*** 1.234 
 (0.089) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.053) (0.879) (0.076) (0.488) (0.049) (0.001) (0.002) (0.769) 
GDP growth  -0.204 1.001*** 0.171 -0.883*** -0.863 -0.737 0.070 1.365*** 0.577* -0.288 -0.676 -0.591 
 (0.647) (0.000) (0.603) (0.002) (0.102) (0.610) (0.871) (0.000) (0.095) (0.316) (0.101) (0.721) 
Inflation -0.167*** -0.027 -0.042 -0.122*** -0.183** -0.249*** -0.243** -0.431*** -0.344*** -0.306*** -0.188*** -0.316*** 
 (0.003) (0.349) (0.196) (0.001) (0.041) (0.006) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Public Invt.  -0.967** -0.460 -0.473 -0.054 -0.721 -1.204 -0.949** -0.819* -0.355 0.145 -0.471 -1.268 
 (0.029) (0.304) (0.181) (0.829) (0.115) (0.181) (0.031) (0.053) (0.332) (0.545) (0.186) (0.197) 
Foreign Aid  -0.983*** 0.298 -0.461** -0.447*** -0.323 -1.753 -0.931*** -0.359 -0.356 -0.319* -0.399* -1.566 
 (0.005) (0.258) (0.030) (0.009) (0.288) (0.166) (0.008) (0.270) (0.106) (0.071) (0.088) (0.276) 
Trade  -0.305*** -0.091 -0.264*** -0.270*** -0.255*** -0.373* -0.292*** -0.171** -0.225*** -0.252*** -0.279*** -0.325 
 (0.000) (0.103) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.054) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.122) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.128 0.084 0.092 0.077 0.045 0.097 0.125 0.095 0.086 0.068 0.053 0.093 
Fisher  5.43***      4.71***      
Observations  290 290 290 290 290 290 256 256 256 256 256 256 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. 
Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial efficiency is least. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Public Invt: Public Investment. 
Internet.PCR: Internet-driven Public Credit Registries. Values in bold denote significant estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 
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Table 8: Internet-driven Information Sharing and Financial Activity 
             
 Financial Activity 
 Panel A: Banking System Activity 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  12.298*** 4.029*** 3.098** 6.854** 12.557*** 17.507* 11.854*** 4.830*** 3.254*** 7.506** 10.492*** 16.403 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.033) (0.039) (0.000) (0.058) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.048) (0.000) (0.102) 
Internet.PCR 6.583*** 3.251*** 4.952*** 6.839*** 9.945*** 11.257*** 7.479*** 3.579*** 5.526*** 7.647*** 10.755*** 11.688*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.166 -0.025 -0.041 -0.184 -0.089 -0.214 -0.093 -0.006 -0.073 -0.167 0.309** -0.081 
 (0.309) (0.744) (0.676) (0.332) (0.595) (0.670) (0.572) (0.926) (0.323) (0.456) (0.026) (0.862) 
Inflation -0.061*** -0.004 -0.020** -0.046* -0.055*** -0.093** -0.084*** -0.004 -0.021*** -0.050*** -0.071*** -0.116*** 
 (0.000) (0.417) (0.014) (0.069) (0.001) (0.040) (0.000) (0.446) (0.004) (0.009) (0.000) (0.001) 
Public Invt.  -0.139 0.032 -0.117 0.224 0.085 0.039 -0.270* -0.009 -0.251*** 0.122 -0.067 -0.039 
 (0.361) (0.720) (0.232) (0.231) (0.564) (0.917) (0.064) (0.903) (0.001) (0.553) (0.546) (0.919) 
Foreign Aid  -0.197* 0.025 0.060 0.046 -0.076 -0.265 -0.172 0.001 0.061 0.058 -0.074 -0.244 
 (0.077) (0.608) (0.296) (0.700) (0.503) (0.567) (0.128) (0.976) (0.198) (0.658) (0.421) (0.547) 
Trade  -0.008 -0.037*** -0.015 -0.042 -0.047* -0.005 0.001 -0.040*** -0.001 -0.038 -0.033 0.007 
 (0.741) (0.000) (0.252) (0.133) (0.067) (0.935) (0.952) (0.000) (0.925) (0.221) (0.123) (0.923) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.514 0.211 0.207 0.246 0.390 0.437 0.525 0.205 0.206 0.250 0.404 0.453 
Fisher  27.79***      24.10***      
Observations  290 290 290 290 290 290 256 256 256 256 256 256 
             
             
 Panel B: Financial System Activity  
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  22.045*** 4.012*** 1.336 6.590* 13.223*** 19.433 21.762*** 5.014*** 0.926 5.984 10.639*** 16.852 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.405) (0.055) (0.000) (0.118) (0.001) (0.000) (0.616) (0.158) (0.000) (0.104) 
Internet.PCR 6.836*** 3.181*** 4.763*** 6.803*** 9.186*** 12.742*** 7.723*** 3.596*** 5.634*** 8.177*** 10.886*** 13.311*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.252 -0.031 -0.070 -0.190 -0.097 -0.131 -0.183 -0.008 -0.066 -0.150 0.139 0.307 
 (0.264) (0.719) (0.533) (0.351) (0.606) (0.844) (0.439) (0.909) (0.573) (0.544) (0.418) (0.524) 
Inflation -0.072*** -0.002 -0.017* -0.044* -0.048** -0.093** -0.099*** -0.020** -0.016 -0.048** -0.074*** -0.111*** 
 (0.000) (0.677) (0.071) (0.083) (0.012) (0.042) (0.000) (0.017) (0.165) (0.018) (0.000) (0.001) 
Public Invt.  -0.107 0.060 -0.019 0.211 0.085 0.079 -0.254 0.007 -0.118 0.128 0.0009 -0.271 
 (0.604) (0.562) (0.858) (0.269) (0.609) (0.877) (0.222) (0.932) (0.369) (0.576) (0.995) (0.458) 
Foreign Aid  -0.501** 0.043 0.153** 0.083 -0.034 -0.268 -0.480** 0.006 0.174** 0.066 -0.037 -0.207 
 (0.015) (0.444) (0.017) (0.501) (0.786) (0.666) (0.026) (0.899) (0.017) (0.657) (0.740) (0.649) 
Trade  -0.075* -0.040*** -0.007 -0.040 -0.049* -0.054 -0.063 -0.044*** 0.0002 -0.035 -0.037 -0.009 
 (0.065) (0.000) (0.602) (0.151) (0.081) (0.579) (0.148) (0.000) (0.989) (0.310) (0.156) (0.901) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.334 0.164 0.168 0.204 0.312 0.324 0.334 0.160 0.165 0.207 0.326 0.331 
Fisher  19.41***      18.60***      
Observations  292 292 292 292 292 292 258 258 258 258 258 258 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. 
Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial activity is least. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Public Invt: Public Investment. 
Internet.PCR: Internet-driven Public Credit Registries. Values in bold denote significant estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 
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Table 9: Internet-driven Information Sharing and Financial Size 
             
 Financial Size 
  
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  75.140*** 42.963*** 67.704*** 87.290*** 97.758*** 97.020*** 73.824*** 41.394*** 65.379*** 86.730*** 96.515*** 99.836*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0..000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet.PCR 2.280*** 3.461** 2.463*** 0.940 0.336 -0.069 2.453*** 3.895 2.698** 1.302*** 0.267 -0.013 
 (0.000) (0.025) (0.004) (0.141) (0.136) (0.645) (0.000) (0.149) (0.025) (0.006) (0.275) (0.956) 
GDP growth  -0.292 -0.362 -0.721** -0.128 -0.275*** 0.043 -0.075 -0.133 -0.664* -0.039 -0.111 -0.023 
 (0.239) (0.498) (0.016) (0.661) (0.003) (0.381) (0.768) (0.904) (0.073) (0.827) (0.151) (0.740) 
Inflation -0.097*** -0.204*** -0.090*** -0.114*** -0.076*** -0.073*** 0.0002*** 0.001** 0.0003* 0.0001* -
0.0001*** 
-
0.0003*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0009) (0.012) (0.056) (0.099) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Invt.  0.841*** 0.880** 0.579* 0.568** 0.402*** 0.225*** 0.742*** 0.888** 0.474* 0.533*** 0.236*** 0.009 
 (0.000) (0.012) (0.059) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) (0.076) (0.001) (0.003) (0.887) 
Foreign Aid  -0.696*** -0.363 -0.955*** -0.936*** -0.923*** -0.482*** -0.630*** -0.414 -0.659*** -0.846*** -0.785*** -0.382*** 
 (0.000) (0.181) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.236) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade  0.034 0.138** 0.094** 0.023 -0.001 0.025*** 0.045 0.129 0.110* 0.012 0.015 0.004 
 (0.257) (0.043) (0.028) (0.541) (0.937) (0.000) ‘(0.148) (0.183) (0.058) (0.617) (0.276) (0.625) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.278 0.188 0.214 0.193 0.197 0.114 0.245 0.171 0.190 0.187 0.167 0.092 
Fisher  29.04***      25.68***      
Observations  291 291 291 291 291 291 261 261 261 261 261 261 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. 
Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where financial size is least. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Public Invt: Public Investment. 
Internet.PCR: Internet-driven Public Credit Registries. Values in bold denote significant estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
Economic Financial Depth   M2 Money Supply (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Depth   Fdgdp Liquid Liabilities (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking System Efficiency   BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Efficiency   FcFd Financial credit on Financial deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking  System Activity  Prcb Private domestic credit from deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Activity Prcbof Private domestic credit from financial institutions (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial Size   Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus Deposit bank 
assets 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Information Sharing Offices PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
   
PCB Private credit bureau coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
    
ICT Mobile Mobile phone penetration (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Internet Internet penetration (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
ICT-driven Information 
Sharing Offices 
MobPCR ‘Mobile phone’-driven Public Credit Registries  Authors’ calculation  
IntPCR Internet-driven Public Credit Registries Authors’ calculation 
MobPCB ‘Mobile phone’-driven Private Credit Bureaus Authors’ calculation 
IntPCB Internet-driven Private  Credit Bureaus Authors’ calculation 
    
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment   PubIvt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Development Assistance    NODA Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade openness  Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics (2004-2011) 
  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
       
 
 
Financial 
Development 
Economic Financial Depth (M2) 34.279 22.294 6.363 112.83 377 
Financial System Depth (Fdgdp)  28.262 21.066 2.926 92.325 377 
Banking  System Efficiency (BcBd)  68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402 
Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402 
Banking System Activity (Pcrb) 72.722 35.884 22.200 252.88 377 
Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) 21.571 24.154 0.010 149.77 379 
Financial Size (Dbacba) 78.073 20.255 4.032 99.949 399   
       
ICT Mobile Phone Penetration  36.659 32.848 0.214 171.51 420 
Internet Penetration  6.822 8.852 0.031 51.00 414 
       
ICT-driven 
Information 
Sharing 
‘Mobile Phone’-driven PCR 2.178 2.039 -0.226 9.346 377 
Internet-driven PCR 2.187 2.148 0.574 12.639 374   
‘Mobile Phone’-driven PCB 4.268 4.759 -1.332 20.961 376 
Internet-driven PCB 4.302 1.460 3.211 11.492 373 
 
Control 
Variables 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 4.996 4.556 -17.66 37.998 404 
Inflation 7.801 4.720   0 43.011 357 
Public Investment 74.778 1241.70 -8.974 24411 387 
Development Assistance  10.396 12.958 0.027 147.05 411 
Trade Openness (Trade) 80.861 32.935 24.968 186.15 392 
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit 
on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit 
from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. ICT: Information 
and Communication Technology. GDPg: GDP growth.  
.  
 33 
        Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix  
             
Financial Development Dynamics  ICT-driven Information Sharing Control Variables  
Financial Depth Fin. Efficency Fin. Activity Fin. Size ICT-driven PCR ICT-driven PCB       
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Prcb Pcrbof Dbacba MobPCR IntPCR MobPCB IntPCB GDPg Inflation PubIvt NODA Trade  
1.000 0.974 0.015 0.047 0.758 0.624 0.355 0.477 0.692 0.488 0.706 -0.103 -0.069 0.042 -0.170 0.145 M2 
 1.000 0.054 0.150 0.846 0.733 0.410 0.516 0.699 0.528 0.712 -0.088 -0.051 0.059 -0.195 0.157 Fdgdp 
  1.000 0.872 0.482 0.474 0.321 0.118 0.126 0.120 0.129 -0.001 -0.035 -0.191 -0.109 -0.141 Bcbd 
   1.000 0.567 0.710 0.275 0.176 0.122 0.176 0.122 -0.071 -0.073 -0.169 -0.126 -0.209 FcFd 
    1.000 0.927 0.466 0.502 0.647 0.509 0.655 -0.097 -0.068 -0.067 -0.212 0.074 Pcrb 
     1.000 0.405 0.472 0.512 0.478 0.520 -0.094 -0.058 -0.062 -0.203 0.012 Pcrbof 
      1.000 0.424 0.350 0.423 0.349 -0.049 -0.115 0.220 -0.493 0.108 Dbacba 
       1.000 0.670 1.000 0.673 -0.137 -0.051 0.062 -0.314 0.257 MobPCR 
        1.000 0.673 1.000 -0.077 0.022 -0.048 -0.262 0.166 IntPCR 
         1.000 0.674 -0.138 -0.051 0.061 -0.312 0.264 MobPCB 
          1.000 -0.086 0.023 -0.051 -0.257 0.179 IntPCB 
           1.000 -0.110 0.157 0.147 0.100 GDPg 
            1.000 -0.082 0.0006 0.006 Inflation  
             1.000 -0.078 0.062 PubIvt 
              1.000 -0.011 NODA 
               1.000 Trade 
                 
          M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit on bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks.  
          Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. Info: Information. PCR: Public Credit 
          Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. ICT: Information and Communication Technology. MobPCR: ‘Mobile Phone’-driven PCR. IntPCR: Internet-driven PCR. MobPCB: ‘Mobile Phone’-driven 
          PCB. IntPCB: Internet-driven PCB. GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth. PubIvt: Public Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. Fin: Financial.  
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